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Chapter 1  
Reversing the neoliberal deformation of 
Europe 
 
 
Jeremy Leaman 
Loughborough University 
 
 
In 2007 Jörg Huffschmid, the German political economist and inspi-
rational campaigner, marked the 50th anniversary of the Rome 
Treaties with a trenchant critique of the ‘neoliberal deformation of 
Europe’ in which he outlines the degree to which the integrationist 
ambitions of the original authors of the European project had been 
diluted, distorted or simply abandoned by the leadership of both the 
Commission and its core member states since the early 1980s 
(Huffschmid 2007). In particular, Huffschmid underscored the 
‘increasing intra-community asymmetries’ which politically and 
economically ‘contain an explosive potential […] which is massively 
endangering the unity of the EU in the medium term’ (Huffschmid 
2007: 314). Huffschmid survived to see the prescience of his remarks 
begin to take grim shape after the outbreak of the global crisis in 2008 
before his untimely death in December 2009. His critique of the 
particular pathology of Europe’s neoliberal illusions was matched by 
a refined understanding of the general pathology of financialised 
capitalism (Huffschmid 2002) and a deeply held apprehension of the 
imminent collapse of the house of cards. While the multiple crisis 
provided fairly unequivocal empirical proof of the long-term 
unviability of the neoliberal project and of the fundamental design 
weaknesses of the EU’s policy architecture, the ideological illusions 
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persist – for some inexplicably (Crouch 2011; Lehndorff 2012) – in 
‘zombie’ form (Quiggin 2010)1. 
 
What follows below is an attempt to account for the ‘persistence of 
failed ideas’ in both the institutional arrangements of the European 
Union and the mindset of its defenders, to outline the severe 
damage they are doing to the peoples of Europe and their long-term 
prospects and to propose some alternatives to their deeply flawed 
policies. Let me start with two metaphors, described by Martin 
Jänicke in 1986 of the tank-driver and the cyclist in relation to two 
modes of policy-making: 
 
A tank driver can be stupid and blind. In contrast to the cyclist, 
he does not need to adapt to the annoying obstacles of the 
environment. Problems are ‘externalised’: It is not the tank 
driver that is damaged but the environment. In the case of the 
cyclist, on the other hand, the problems of an adaptive method 
of driving are completely internalised. 
(Jänicke 1986: 158) 
 
The metaphors of cyclist (reflective adaptation) and tank-driver 
(blind refusal to reflect, learn and adapt) are arguably fully applicable 
to an analysis of the current dilemmas facing Europe. There are 
certainly few signs of adaptable cyclists in positions of power. The 
metaphors thus allow us to consider the reasons for Europe’s fatal 
addiction to failed recipes, in particular to the straitjacket of a 
currency union, whose policy architecture is stubbornly resistant to 
reflection or change. Four-and-a-half years into Europe’s worst social 
and economic crisis in many decades, the clinging of policy-elites to 
an intellectual corpse indicates above all a comprehensive misdiag-
nosis of the causes of that crisis. While the role of the financial services 
sector in triggering the crisis has clearly been acknowledged by EU-
leaders, while regulatory reforms of banking have been initiated in 
most core member states, while even a Financial Transaction Tax 
within Europe is being proposed, these and related policy initiatives 
are dwarfed by the centrality of sovereign debt consolidation in 
Europe’s ‘reform’ agenda. The priority of fiscal consolidation, before 
any other macro-economic preferences, implies the primacy of ‘fiscal 
                                                                 
1 See also P. Krugman ‘When Zombies Win’, New York Times, 19 December 2010. 
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irresponsibility’ in the causal chain resulting in the global crisis. This 
primacy is clearly evident in the contradictory persistence during 
2008 and 2009 of the Commission’s ‘excessive deficit’ obsession in 
relation to new member states (Leaman 2012a: 175ff), particularly 
when most Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) had lower 
public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR) and debt ratios than 
their counterparts in the EU15. This obsession was given European 
Central Bank (ECB) support at an early stage in 2009, as Europe was 
experiencing the worst recession in 80 years, when Jean-Claude 
Trichet asserted that states had reached the limit of indebtedness and 
would need to start reducing their borrowing in 2010 in order to 
reassure consumers and financial markets.2 In April 2010, Trichet 
surprised one questioner by asserting and, on request, repeating the 
conviction that ‘the market is always right, and has to be completely 
respected at all times’ (cited in Lehndorff 2012: 7). Finally, and shortly 
before his departure as President of the European Central Bank in 
2010, in a speech declaring the imminent restoration of full health to 
European capitalism, Trichet stated that all the ECB had to do was to 
accompany ‘the market as it progressively gets back to normal’.3 
 
Defining market ‘normality’ in empirical-historical terms would be 
difficult enough, given the wide variety of market relationships and 
dynamics both at given times and over time. The normality of 
‘oligopolies’ or ‘monopsonies’, where concentrated economic power 
determines those dynamics, will arguably not have been Trichet’s 
understanding. However, neither can the increasingly bizarre market 
conditions of the neoliberal era be understood as norms of sustainable 
economic activity to which we should ever dream of returning. 
Trichet’s simple invocation of an infallible market is nevertheless 
deeply worrying, particular in the context of the scientific ruins of the 
efficient market hypothesis and the continuing paralysis of financial 
and investment markets in Europe. 
                                                                 
2 ‘ECB chief Trichet says governments have reached borrowing limit’, The Guardian, 
21 June 2009, retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jun/21
/ecb-trichet-budget-deficit-warning> (last accessed 1 October 2013).  
3 ‘Interview with Jean-Claude Trichet’, Financial Times, 8 September 2010, retrieved 
from: <http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100910.en.html> 
(last accessed 1 October 2013). 
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Discounting market fallibility à la Trichet thus pre-programmes the 
colossal misdiagnosis of the extent, severity and implications of 
Europe’s multidimensional crisis (See Box 1.1). 
 
Box 1.1 Europe’s multiple crises 2007–2013 
1. A functional crisis of the global system of financial services; banking 
and related services have become incapable of ‘servicing’ the 
circuits of production, service-provision, investment and 
consumption; 
 
2. A cyclical crisis of production, consumption, trade, investment 
and employment, which is threatening to become a regional 
‘slump’ greater than that of the 1930s; 
 
3. A structural crisis of ‘over-commitment’ to financial services as 
vehicle of growth; this in turn involves a fundamental crisis of 
capitalist commercial psychology, notably of the exaggerated 
profit-expectations underpinning Ponzi-capitalism; public and 
private pension funds, social insurance funds, private invest-
ment funds, private and corporate shareholders had become 
fatally addicted to the unsustainably high rates of return, 
provided by hyper-leveraging and hyper-appreciation of 
financial assets; 
 
4. A crisis of the ‘growth’ paradigm as policy vehicle for ensuring 
economic and social equilibrium, where the simple saturation 
of markets and increasing elasticity of demand renders the 
delivery of convenient incremental increases in output less 
feasible; the temporary illusion of growth and affluence 
provided by Ponzi-style circuits of fictitious capital can be seen 
as a desperate attempt to defy the reality of the increasingly 
limited growth potential of affluent societies; 
 
5. A continuing crisis of the ‘growth’ paradigm as basis for planetary 
survival; the depletion of resources, bio-diversity, habitat-quality, 
along with the consequences of man-made global warming, pose 
colossal challenges to current generations in their efforts to 
bequeath a viable bio-sphere to future generations. 
 
 
Reversing the neoliberal deformation of Europe 47 
 
6. The first four crises above amount to a clear crisis of the neoliberal 
paradigm; the bankruptcy of the ‘efficient market’ hypothesis 
and the illusions of ‘the’ market’s self-healing properties are 
evident and crass. 
 
7. The failure by ‘epistemic policy communities’ to acknowledge 
the intellectual bankruptcy of the neoliberal paradigm 
betokens a continuing crisis of economic discourse, characterised 
by an institutionalised resistance to reflection and to holistic, 
interdisciplinary approaches to human social and economic 
relationships which acknowledge the profound (global and 
societal) interconnectedness of those relationships; 
 
8. This in turn has revealed a deep crisis of economic management, 
characterised by the utter powerlessness of monetarist inspired 
independent central banks to control the ‘liquidity factories’ of 
casino capitalism (Phillips 2008; Mellor 2010); the theological 
centrality of the quantity theory of money was rendered absurd 
by the embarrassing inability of either Bundesbank or ECB 
leaderships to explain the disparity between a ballooning money 
stock and low growth and low aggregate inflation (Leaman 
2012b). Europe’s policy architecture, built so confidently around 
the separation of a dominant central monetary authority and 
subordinate national fiscal authorities looks clearly inappropriate 
as a means of mastering the above multiple crises and 
maintaining democratic legitimacy in the process. 
 
The above clearly betokens much more than a temporary cyclical or 
structural crisis of an otherwise secure mode of production, and 
rather an existential crisis of capitalism itself, unheeded by its corporate 
elites and its political ‘managers’ alike. It is thus very much ‘different 
this time’. The resultant recoveries from ‘the’ crisis are therefore very 
unlikely to follow the patterns exhibited by states in earlier financial 
crises, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest. 
 
A central argument of this paper is that the scale and effect of 
Europe’s on-going multiple crisis have been systematically trivialised 
by policy-makers, with corresponding implications for their crisis 
management priorities. There have been several attempts to quantify 
the scale of the global crisis in terms of output losses. One is in fact an 
occasional paper by staff at the Commission’s Directorate General for 
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Economic and Financial Affairs (DGFEA) (European Commission 
2009) which strikes a very sober note of warning in its preliminary 
assessment of the long-term effects of the crisis, presenting both 
‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic/realistic’ scenarios of losses in output and 
investment within the EU over twenty years. Both scenarios foresee 
permanent output losses: of 0.5 per cent in the optimistic variant 
and 4.5 per cent annually in the pessimistic variant (Figure 1.1). The 
findings of the DGEFA paper are in line with both specific studies of 
the 2008 crisis (Haldane 2010a) and the general conclusions of 
comparative studies of historical financial crises (Abiad et al. 2009); 
however, for whatever reason, the DGEFA paper does not translate 
the warning into a set of prescriptive policy proposals, in contrast to 
Abiad et al. (2009: 27) who at least imply that countervailing fiscal 
measures reduce the deviation from trend growth! 
 
The DGEFA paper, even as early as 2009, nevertheless acknowledges 
that pessimism over recovery and long-term prospects represents the 
‘realistic’ scenario. It also underscores the potential effects of an 
extended crisis on a broader set of variables within the economies of 
the EU27. Beyond the permanent loss of output and unused capital 
stock, the paper also talks about a possible ‘permanent destruction in 
human capital, leading to an irreversible (sic author) rise in the 
structural unemployment rate’ (European Commission 2009: 14); a 
‘protracted recession’ might also reduce the labour force participation 
rate by ‘discouraging vulnerable workers from seeking a job’ (ibid.); 
furthermore growth rates and productivity could be adversely affected 
by specific crises in vulnerable branches of the economy like financial 
services, construction and motor vehicles (European Commission 2009: 
15) and by a ‘slow process of industrial restructuring’; finally growth 
and productivity ‘could also be permanently affected by a reduction in 
innovative activities due to lower (private) research and development 
(R&D) investments, which tend to be cyclical, and more limited 
opportunities for the transfer of knowledge (ibid.). 
 
 The permanent waste of human capital is already palpably evident 
in the high levels of youth unemployment in the whole region (Figure 
1.2); November figures showed an average rate of youth 
unemployment at 23.7 per cent for the EU27 and 24.4 per cent in 
the eurozone, with Greece (57.6 per cent) and Spain (56.5 per cent) 
the leaders of a grim table of squandered ‘human capital’. Micro-
level studies of early career unemployment (Gregory and Jukes 
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2001; Gregg and Tominey 2004) have already identified a 
permanent ‘scarring effect’ on later average earnings. The worsening 
of already high structural unemployment among 15–24 year-olds 
arguably allows us to conclude that such scarring in Europe will be 
 
Figure 1.1: Losses in potential output in EU27 2008–2027 (estimated) 
Source: European Commission (2009) Impact of the Current Economic and 
Financial Crisis on Potential Output, Occasional Paper, Brussels, p. 8. 
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Figure 1.2: Youth unemployment in Europe (EU27 and eurozone) 
2000–2012 
Source: Eurostat (2013) ‘Unemployment rate by sex and age groups –
monthly average, %’. Retrieved from< http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/n
ui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_m&lang=en> (last accessed 8 October 2013). 
 
Reversing the neoliberal deformation of Europe 51 
 
chronic for current generations. International Labour Office 
research also demonstrates the disproportionate level of youth 
unemployment in social groups with lower levels of educational 
attainment (International Labour Office 2012: 46). 
 
 Eurostat data for 2011 confirm a trend towards a lower participation 
rate, from 65.3 per cent of the 15–65 year-olds in 2007 to 64.3 per 
cent in 2011, but again with severe falls in Greece from 61.4 per cent 
to 55.6 per cent, and Spain (65.6 per cent to 57.7 per cent). 
 
These figures, however, are clearly distorted by the wide variance in 
part-time employment (Figure 1.3), with an EU27 average of 19.4 per 
cent of total employment but with comparatively low part-time ratios in 
less developed and newer member states (the 12 new member states 
plus Portugal and Greece have an average of just 8.4 per cent part-
time employment). It can therefore be argued that the higher part-
time employment ratios in the old core member states of the EU15 
mitigate the scarring effect of early career unemployment, even if 
those figures conceal higher levels of under-employment in more 
developed economies. 
 
The pre-existing disparities in Research and Development (R&D) Intensity 
have been both acknowledged by the EU, and their reduction was 
made one of the main targets of the Lisbon 2020 strategy (European 
Commission 2007). Again the core-periphery distribution of R&D 
expenditure is marked, with Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic 
the exceptions that prove the general rule of a high concentration in the 
northern core states. However, the EU average of 1.98 per cent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) remains significantly behind that of both 
Japan and the USA, with China already converging on static European 
levels in 2005 (ibid: 76). The case of Greece is instructive, firstly because 
its R&D ratio is modest at 0.58 per cent of GDP and, secondly, because 
it is overwhelmingly represented by the public sector in contrast to the 
major players in the region where the public/private funding-mix is 
seemingly more balanced (ibid.: 82); this should not deflect attention 
from the general problem of cuts to research-funding that have been 
mooted at both MAFF-level and at that of member states. It 
nevertheless reinforces the suspicion that, without a radical redirection 
of Structural Funds or a general reversal of austerity programmes at 
member state level with a strong focus on modernisation through R&D, 
the Lisbon targets (Figure 1.4) will be missed, and that private funding 
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Figure 1.3: Part-time employment in the EU27 as a proportion of total 
employment in 2011 
Source: Eurostat (2012) ‘Around 8.5 million part-time workers in the EU27 
wished to work more hours’, Newsrelease 12/61. 
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Figure 1.4: Expenditure on research and development as a 
proportion of GDP in per cent 
Source: European Commission (2011) ‘Europe 2020 Targets: Research and 
Development’. Retrieved from: <http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/
15_research__development.pdf> (last accessed 13 August 2013). 
Notes 
(1) EL: 2007; PT: 2010; (2) CZ: A target (of 1 %) is available only for the public sector; 
(3) CZ: A target (of 1%) is available only for the public sector; (4) UK: A targets for 
2020 is not available. 
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will gravitate towards the established centres of innovation. Greece, for 
example, has experienced six successive years of severe contraction in 
investment (a fall of 86.4 percentage points from 2006!)4, and cannot 
realistically be expected to attract research-intensive monies from either 
domestic or foreign sources. 
 
The DGEFA’s pessimistic forecast of additional knock-effects of a 
‘protracted recession’ (apart from permanent output losses of trillions 
of euros) would therefore seem to be grimly accurate, judged from 
this brief survey of the current situation, four years on. 
Neoliberalism, monetary accumulation and the 
dilution of value 
The neoliberal catastrophe is not confined to the recent bursting of 
financial asset-bubbles and its social and political aftermath, however. 
The process of value-dilution arguably began almost simultaneously with 
the conversion of policy-makers and their wider community of 
academic and administrative advisers (their ‘epistemic’ community) to 
monetarism and Thatcherite supply-sidism. A recent study of the British 
economy by Martin Weale demonstrates in graphic form two major 
periods of value-destruction since the 1920s, the first beginning in 1930 
through to the end of the Second World War, the second starting in 1980. 
 
Weale himself does not employ the concept of ‘value-destruction’ but 
of economic ‘sustainability’ threatened, as he sees it, by the decline of 
the UK’s wealth-to-GDP ratio (Weale 2012: 62ff) – where wealth is 
defined as capital stock plus net foreign assets and net national saving. 
His analysis nevertheless provides an eloquent illustration of the 
similar effects of depression/war on the one hand and the neoliberal 
paradigm on the other, inasmuch as the weakening of the overall 
wealth ratio between 1930 and 1945 was followed by a gradual recov-
ery up until 1980, ‘after which it has declined sharply again’ (ibid.), 
reaching the historically low level of 1945 again between 2000 and 2005 
(see Figure 1.5). Weale stresses the significance of the weakened wealth 
ratio in terms of intergenerational equity, where the over-consumption 
of recent generations is judged to leave a less viable foundation for 
future welfare than the one inherited in 1980. However, Weale’s data 
also provide ammunition for demonstrating the allocatory 
                                                                 
4 Figures from OECD Economic Outlook 92, October 2012. 
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diseconomies of the paradigm of ‘monetary accumulation’ as a 
function of poorer investment and saving between 1980 and 2005. 
These weakened the long-term resilience of the UK economy, even 
before the further wealth-destruction during the 2008–9 crash. His 
analysis also suggests that similar conclusions can be drawn from the 
general decline of the investment ratio in all advanced economies. 
The following remarks seek to demonstrate the destructive effect of 
neoliberalism in terms of both overall investment and the particular 
role of public investment in sustaining social and economic welfare. 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Ratio of produced wealth to GDP in the UK 1920–2005 
Source: Weale, M. (2012) ‘Unsustainable Consumption: The structural flaw 
behind the UK’s long boom’, in Giudice, G., Kuenzel, R. and Springbrett, T. 
(eds) UK Economy: the Crisis in Perspective, London: Routledge, p. 62. 
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Figure 1.6: Profits ratio and investment ratio in advanced economies 
1980–2005. 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2007) World Economic Outlook, 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from: <http://www.i
mf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/pdf/text.pdf> (last accessed 24 Sep-
tember 2013). Data from Charts 1.15 and 5.7; profits ratio defined as the 
share of income from capital in national income before tax and transfers; 
investment ratio is the proportion of gross fixed capital formation to GDP in any 
given year. 
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Figure 1.6 above provides strong evidence disproving neoliberal 
claims of the efficacy of supply-side reforms on real economic 
growth in the world’s advanced economies. IMF data for both the 
share of profit income in net GDP (national income) and gross fixed 
capital formation as a proportion of GDP contradict the claim that 
higher profit income generates higher real investment; a 6.8 
percentage pointrise in the profits ratio in advanced economies 
between 1980 and 2005 stands in stark contrast to the 2.8 percentage 
point decline in the investment ratio. The assumed virtuous circle of 
higher profits, facilitated inter alia by tax relief and labour market 
reforms, leading to higher investment, higher production levels, 
higher employment and a new sustainable, market-driven dynamic 
economy, falls at the first hurdle. 
 
Given that the linkage between investment and growth is fairly 
robust (see Rajan 2010: 70), that the investment ratios of the EU’s core 
economies have been on a declining trend for some time, that the rise 
in the European profits ratio in the observed period was even greater 
than the OECD average (at over 9 percentage points) and that Europe 
has been the world region with the most anaemic growth rates for 
two decades, one is justified in asking: what went wrong with the 
supply-side growth revolution? A very brief survey of the actual 
processes of the neoliberalisation of markets since the 1980s is 
necessary to explain the mal-functioning of supply-side transmission 
mechanisms in the macro-economy. 
 
 Neoliberal reforms of the state included the extensive privatisation 
of state assets, many of them natural monopolies like the gas, 
power and water utilities or public transport networks and hubs 
(airports, ports); while telecommunications became increasingly 
subject to the competitive influence of cable and satellite technolo-
gies, most utilities remained natural monopolies, inaccessible to 
genuine market competition and its associated price efficiencies. 
The most popular solutions to the problem of the potential abuse 
of monopoly pricing in such utilities were the political regulation 
of rates of return (favoured in the US) or price/tariff changes (UK), 
with regular adjustments according to set formulae. Such 
regulatory systems operated on the assumption that there must be 
continuity of supply, provision for modernisation and long-term 
investment and (implicitly or explicitly) a guaranteed return on 
capital (see Stern 2003: 22). It is unsurprising that the performance 
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of such regulated monopolies has ensured higher returns on 
capital than applies to the SME sector (Candeias 2009); their 
revenues represent monopoly rents guaranteed for given contrac-
tual periods. Such privatisation programmes became core elements 
of state policy in advanced states and of the development policy of 
advanced states and supra-national institutions like the World 
Bank and the European Union. 
 
 An extension of straightforward privatisation of state-owned assets 
was the introduction of ‘public-private-partnerships’, involving the 
private financing of public building and civil engineering projects 
and medium- to long-term leases granted to the companies with 
guaranteed income streams from the public institutions (in 
education, health, transport etc.), operating their services from the 
facilities. A strong determinant motive in such schemes was the 
desire by state authorities to minimise the effect of such public 
sector projects on the state’s borrowing requirements in a period 
(1990 to date) dominated by the monetarist strictures of deflation 
and debt-consolidation. Such projects nevertheless also involved 
guaranteed monopoly rents within contracts that have been 
frequently criticised for their generosity towards the private 
partners. Recent official UK studies of the efficacy of the 700 or so 
PFI projects also cast serious doubt on both their underlying 
principles and their viability (e.g. House of Commons 2011). 
 
 Against this background of state policies helping to engineer 
higher than average rates of return on capital through guaranteed 
monopoly income streams, the investment options open to 
companies with growing capital reserves already militated 
against the risk of simply expanding and modernising capacity in 
traditional commercial sectors; more significantly the privati-
sation programmes raised expectations of rates of return that 
would become increasingly difficult for such traditional sectors to 
deliver (see Haldane 2010b: 13). What then emerges from the 
parallel accumulation of corporate reserves in the MNCs of 
advanced states and the transfer of ‘petro-dollars’ from rich oil-
producing states to the financial institutions of the North is a 
highly liquid global market for finance capital in search, not of 
secure but modest long-term returns on invested capital, but of 
increasingly high returns on capital that is committed for ever 
shorter periods of time (Huffschmid 2002). 
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 In addition to these determinants of rising ROR expectations, in 
the early 1980s the monetary authorities of the advanced 
economies – led by the Federal Reserve – presided over a sudden 
increase in real interest rates which increased bond yields to historic 
highs; this was driven both by orthodox monetarist deflationary 
policies via higher central bank base rates, but also by the fairly 
unorthodox strategic military programmes of the Reagan 
administration and their heavy reliance on deficit-spending. 
Accordingly, US 10-Year real bond yields reached 14 per cent in 
1982. One commentator describes returns on bonds in recent 
decades as ‘super-sized’, noting that ‘real bond returns after 
inflation in both the US and UK have been on average 5.9 per cent 
compound per annum – some three to four times the long term 
average respectively’5. Such returns on state guaranteed financial 
assets thus also contributed to increasing levels of expectation on 
the part of major investors, particularly in a period of low or 
negative growth, preparing the ground for the wholesale 
revolution in financial services that ensued (see Huffschmid 2002; 
Mellor 2010; Phillips 2008; Tett 2009). 
 
The important feature of the paradigm shift to financialised capitalism 
and monetary accumulation was that it was constructed on the illusion 
of enhanced wealth-creation, of the appreciation of paper assets which of 
themselves would produce ‘value’ and improve the welfare of citizens 
on a sustainable basis. Even a UK Treasury economist, like Andrew 
Haldane, demonstrates rather that the contribution of the financial 
sector to growth and ‘value’ was in large measure a ‘mirage’ (Haldane 
2010b). The mirage of seemingly effortless value-appreciation through 
the operation of financial circuits nevertheless maintained an aston-
ishing level of credibility among policy-elites, credit-rating-agencies 
and the academic community, defying the warning signs of the East 
Asian Crisis of 1997, the Enron debacle of 2001 and the ‘dotcom’-crisis 
of 2001–2, as well as the intuitive logic of observers who suggested it 
was difficult to create value out of ‘thin air’ (Mellor 2010 etc.). 
Nevertheless, the ‘fool’s gold’ paradigm (Tett 2008) was only revealed 
to be what it was to wider sections of global civil society when the 
                                                                 
5 ‘Are Government Bonds in Developed Markets Overvalued’, Gillen Markets, 1 
April 2011, retrieved from: <http://www.gillenmarkets.com/featured_articles/are-
government-bonds-in-developed-markets-overvalued.cfm> (last accessed 13 August 
2013). 
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affairs of Lehmann brothers, AIG etc. became public in the autumn of 
2008. Haldane’s account of the ‘productivity miracle’ of financial 
services is persuasively simple, inasmuch as he uncovers the basic 
accountancy tricks of banks and other institutions which allowed them 
to create vast quantities of liquidity without altering the ‘health’ of 
their visible balance sheets or increasing their basic capital. They achie-
ved this through a combination of hyper-leveraging (borrowing) and 
securitisation (converting loans/liabilities into securities/assets based 
on future income streams). Far from suggesting a dilution of the asset-
side of the balance sheet, such operations – often through so-called 
special-purpose-vehicles (SPVs) belonging to the same bank – the 
asset-side was seemingly increased by the on-going appreciation of the 
bonds (CDOs, ABSs etc.) on secondary markets and the persistence of 
triple-A ratings delivered by compliant credit ratings agencies. The 
colossal liabilities represented by leverage ratios of ‘more than 50 times 
equity at the peak of the boom’ (Haldane 2010b: 15) were thus spirited 
off balance sheets in smoke-and-mirrors operations involving multi-
layered ownership structures, shell companies and offshore secrecy 
jurisdictions. 
 
The deployment of so much liquidity in the febrile capital markets 
of the 1990s and 2000s allowed a corresponding increase in the rate-
of-return on equity (ROE): ‘the level of ROEs was consistently at or 
above 20 per cent and on a rising trend up until the crisis. This is 
roughly double ROEs in the non-financial sector over the period’ 
(Haldane 2010b: 13). Moreover with the banks ‘engaged in a highly 
competitive ROE race’ (ibid.), the pressure to continue the 
leverage/securitisation merry-go-round was very high, suppressing 
what remained of scepticism and prudence at the level of executive 
boards, investment analysts, credit ratings agencies and institutional 
investors. Such post hoc insights by a Treasury insider beg the question 
as to why there were so few warnings from the policy elites of 
advanced states and of supra-national institutions, when financial 
ROEs were so clearly abnormal. 
 
The dilution of real wealth in the decades of the recent three decades 
of financialised capitalism is also evident in the changing shape of the 
asset holdings of ‘non-financial institutions’ (NFEs) or ‘non-banks’. 
Figures from the European Central Bank (2007) covering the balance 
sheet composition of all NFEs in the eurozone show that between 
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1995 and 2005, the ratio of their financial assets to tangible fixed 
assets more than doubled from an average of 0.53 to 1.18. 
 
Figure 1.7: Ratio of financial to fixed capital in eurozone non-financial 
enterprises 1995–2005 
Source: European Central Bank (2007) ‘Corporate Finance in the Euro Area 
with Some Background Materials’, Occasional Paper No 63/ June, p. 21. 
 
Most striking is the transformation of the balance sheets of 
manufacturing enterprises with financial assets in 2005 totalling 171 
per cent of physical assets (see Figure 1.7), a virtual doubling in just 
ten years. Figures for the individual branches of Germany’s dominant 
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manufacturing sector show a marked trend towards the 
financialisation of their asset portfolios in the previous decade-and-a-
half between 1980 and 1985, with motor manufacturers reaching an 
average financial asset ratio of 1.57, electro-technical corporations 
1.76 and German chemical TNCs a ratio of 2.0 (see Leaman 2009: 80f). 
The not infrequent references to Siemens and Daimler-Benz as banks 
with manufacturing subsidiaries find strong empirical support from 
such data. 
 
A critical determinant of this historically unprecedented shift in the 
way in which industrial corporations valorised their capital, deriving 
sizeable proportions of their operating profits from financial securi-
ties, rather than the sale of products and services, was the adoption of 
‘shareholder-value’ as the predominant measurement of commercial 
success. Lazonick (2011) identifies the particular role of stock (share) 
options in the remuneration packages of senior managers in driving 
this process in the United States. The option to be rewarded by extra 
tranches of a company’s stock skewed incentives, according to 
Lazonick, particularly within larger corporations, towards short-term 
commercial strategies designed to drive bull markets. 
 
With average compensation in the Top 100 US corporations varying 
from ‘lows’ of $18.2 million (1994) and $103.7 million (2000), stock opti-
ons accounted for well over two thirds in most years in the period 
1992–2008 (Lazonick 2011: 8). One of the most potent vehicles for 
generating significant increases in corporate share values was in the 
(frequently hostile) takeover of other enterprises or the acquisition of 
majority holdings in other corporations. Figure 1.8 shows how dramatic 
the two waves of global takeovers were between 1990 and 2006, with 
record deal values of $4 trillion in both 2000 and 2006. The efficacy of 
mergers and acquisitions activity, as noted above, is strongly contested 
by a number of studies, one suggesting that 70 per cent fail (Campbell et 
al. 2008), another that hostile takeovers have a generally worse record 
(Martynova et al. 2006); in the case of banks, Haldane cites research 
suggesting that ‘economies of scale in banking are exhausted at 
relatively modest levels of assets, perhaps between $5–10 billion’ and 
that subsequently there ‘is no strong evidence of increased bank 
efficiency after a merger or acquisition’ (Haldane 2010a: 11). 
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Figure 1.8: Global mergers and acquisitions 1990–2006. Value in 
USD billion 
Source: Dealogic, M & A Analytics, statistical platform, available at 
<http://www.dealogic.com/investment-banking/ma-analytics/> (last accessed 
15 October 2013). 
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Against the background of the ‘common knowledge’ that ‘most M&A 
activity is value-destroying’ , as asserted by a mainstream economist 
(Haldane 2010b: 21; my emphasis), his subsequent assessment of the 
extraordinary degree of concentration in the banking sector, 
particularly after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US in 1999 
(Haldane 2010a: 6 and 18) supports the view of many heterodox 
economists that the ‘merger mania’ of the last two decades generated 
colossal gains for the minority of banking and other corporate 
executives involved in hyper-leveraged buyouts, but equally colossal 
risks for the compliant and complacent states and their respective 
citizens, risks that exploded in the autumn of 2008 and the costs of 
which have not even yet been remotely grasped by policy ‘elites’ at 
political or corporate level. 
 
The role of the neoliberal state in the transformation of European 
and global capitalism is inherently contradictory, inasmuch as the 
executive decisions of key national administrations have involved a 
conscious self-marginalisation, withdrawal from the responsibility 
of key allocatory functions within national and regional political 
economies. Both the territorial mobility and, above all, the effective 
privatisation of money-creation by corporations (Box 1.1 above), 
has rendered states and supranational political institutions increasing-
ly powerless to manage either fiscal or monetary affairs effectively. 
 
The political disempowerment of politics qua management of the 
political economy produced what Richard Murphy terms the 
‘cowardly state’. Of fundamental significance, finally, in the process 
of weakening the asset-base of European political economies has been 
the particular decline of public investment as a critical ingredient of 
social progress. Gomez and Pouget (2008) chart the decline of public 
investment in 21 OECD economies from some 4.5 per cent of GDP in 
the early 1970s to less than 3 per cent in the most recent decade (Figure 
1.9). The pattern of decline is not identical in all economies, but most 
marked in Europe’s core economies (France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Britain). The authors seek, in particular to draw a 
correlation between the provision of public infrastructural assets 
and overall investment and align themselves with those who assert 
that (inward) real investment by private companies is more strongly 
determined by the provision of public goods than by benign 
corporate tax regimes, in that ‘the provision of public capital creates 
rents for the firms’ (Gomez and Pouget 2008: 7). They in fact go on 
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to postulate both the positive multiplier effect of state investment on 
growth and private investment (as demand-side variables) and the 
negative effects of strategic reductions in both public investment 
and rates of corporation tax (as supply-side variables). 
Figure 1.9: Public investment and public capital in the OECD 1960–
2010 
Source: Gomez, P. and Pouget, F. (2008) ‘Corporate Tax Competition and 
the Decline of Public Investment’, European Central Bank Working Paper 
08/928, Frankfurt: European Central Bank, p. 7. 
 
The findings of this persuasive working paper by staff at the 
European Central Bank cast serious doubt on neoliberal orthodoxy 
and strengthen the case of heterodox economists in their espousal of 
both demand-side strategies and a reinvigorated, active state. 
Moreover, these findings are supported by recent, persuasive 
research into fiscal multipliers (Coenen et al. 2012; Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko 2011) as well as the extraordinary acknowledgement 
of mistakes by senior IMF analysts (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). The 
relevance of such findings (from, among others, staff of two pillars of 
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the Troika) for the analysis of Europe’s current crisis of economic 
management is, along with the evidence presented above, good 
reason to assert the catastrophic consequences of Europe’s persistence 
with state inaction and austerity. 
 
The tank-driver ploughs on: The destructive 
consequences of EU policy-paralysis 
The reconvened budget summit of the European Council on 7 and 8 
February 2013, produced a set of general conclusions (European 
Council 2013a) and a second document (European Council 2013b) 
devoted to the European Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF). Both documents provide significant indicators of the mind-set 
that is driving the EU’s macro-economic strategy. Both documents are 
a serious cause for concern. Their intellectual ‘logic’ defies both the 
evidence of the last thirty years of European economic history and the 
last four years of crisis-‘management’. The ‘triumph’ of an agreed 
compromise6 on the EU’s budget for seven years from 2014 to 2020 
should provoke the strongest possible response from academic econo-
mists and political economists, along with the rest of Europe’s active 
civil society groups. The bankruptcy of Europe’s ‘depression econo-
mics’ (Krugman 2008) and the imposition of Brüning-style austerity 
should and hopefully will be judged the most dismal ‘triumph of failed 
ideas’ (Lehndorff 2012; see Crouch 2011) in recent years. 
 
If we take the MFF first, the trajectory of the proposed expenditure 
reductions is pro-cyclical in nature, compounding the thrust of 
member states’ austerity programmes, and neoliberal in spirit, 
reducing an already modest pool of collective resources even further 
and, with it, the opportunity to promote shared prosperity through 
the financing of European public goods. Table 1.1 compares the most 
recent budget cycle (2007–2013) and the new MFF in terms of the 
proportions of EU Gross National Income represented by ‘payment 
appropriations’ (real planned expenditure) and ‘commitment appro-
priations’ (maximum hypothetical expenditure including contingency 
funds). Actual expenditure levels for the (current) 2007 cycle can be 
seen to rise from 1 per cent of the gross national income (GNI) to 1.05 
per cent in 2013 (1.06 per cent average for the cycle), while the 
expenditure plans for the cycle beginning next year envisage a GNI-
                                                                 
6 See ‘Cameron’s Euro Triumph’, The Telegraph, 9 February 2013. 
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share falling from 0.98 per cent of GNI to 0.91 per cent in 2020, a drop 
of 14 basis points (over 13 per cent) in seven years. 
 
Table 1.1: EU multiannual financial frameworks 2007–13 and 2014–
20 compared 
Appropriations 
as percentage of 
gross national 
income 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 7 Year 
ave-
rage 
Total commitment 
appropriations  
1.02 1.08 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.13 1.12 1.12
Total payment 
appropriations 
1.00 1.05 1.04 1.12 1.09 1.08 1.05 1.06
  
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
 
2017 
 
2018 
 
2019 
 
2020 
Total commitment 
appropriations  
1.03 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00
Total payment 
appropriations 
0.98 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.95
Source: European Council, Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework), 
EUCO 37/13, Brussels, 8 February 2013. 
Notes 
The 2014–20 budget cycle assumes an enlarged EU from 2013 to 28 member states, 
including Croatia. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the starting-point for both expenditure 
ratios in 2014 is lower than the end-point ratios for the last budget-
cycle (0.98/1.03 against 1.05/1.12). The process of budget reductions 
is described in §1 as ‘smart fiscal consolidation’, matching the ‘smart 
growth’ rhetoric of the Lisbon agenda, repeated in the MFF §13. It 
will not have escaped the attention of neutral observers that growth – 
smart, scruffy or otherwise – has been stubbornly elusive over the last 
four years. While the imminence of recovery has been regularly invo-
ked since the second half of 2009, nineteen of the EU’s twenty-seven 
member states had, by December 2012, still not recovered to the 
output levels of 2008, as evidenced by Figure 1.10. Furthermore, of 
the nine other states (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Malta, Slovakia, Sweden, Poland), only three are showing recoveries 
of any note: Poland (+13 per cent), Sweden (+6.2 per cent) and 
Slovakia (+5.1 per cent). 
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Figure 1.10: Real GDP growth of EU27 member states 2008–2012. 
Source: OECD; Eurostat; own calculations. 
 
Final quarter figures for 2012, published by Eurostat six days after 
the MFF, on February 14, confirmed that the eurozone had contrac-
ted by 0.9 per cent year-on-year in the last three months of 2012, 
with the EU27 averaging -0.6 per cent). The marginal recoveries of 
France and Belgium since 2008 are in reverse with year-on-year falls 
in GDP of -0.3 per cent and -0.4 per cent respectively (Eurostat 
2013b). The OECD in December was forecasting a further decline of 
eurozone GDP of -0.1 per cent, with recessions in six of the EU27’s 
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OECD members; Greece is due for a sixth consecutive year of con-
traction in 2013, Italy for its fourth year of negative growth out of 
six, Spain and Portugal (fourth in five years), Slovenia and Hungary 
(third in five years). The IMF’s February update of its 2013 forecast 
suggests a contraction of -0.2 per cent in the eurozone. There is, 
however, a strong case to suggest an even worse outcome for Euro-
pean economies in 2013, given the constellation of domestic demand 
factors, all of which are set to contract further in the current year. 
 
Most critically, eurozone gross investments – already at just 83.2 per 
cent of 2007 levels in 2012 – are forecast to decline further, by -1.9 
per cent according to OECD December 2012 estimates. While the 
reluctance of Europe’s (non-financial) enterprises to invest can be 
rightly blamed in part on the corresponding reluctance of banks and 
other financial institutions to provide affordable credit as a supply-
side factor (European Central Bank 2013: 115), the persistence of 
very low levels of capacity utilisation – as indicator of demand – 
arguably represent an even more significant obstacle to any sizeable 
recovery of investments in either commercial property or 
equipment.7 The European Union is thus set to remain the least 
dynamic economic region in the world.8 
 
The absence of any signs of significant growth in all three compo-
nents of domestic demand draws our attention to the other pillar of 
the European Council’s strategy, revealed on February 8, namely 
trade as the primary vehicle for general economic recovery. Sixteen of 
the nineteen paragraphs in the general conclusions (EUCO 3/13) are 
devoted to the EU’s ‘ambitious trade agenda’, outlining the way in 
which this can make ‘a significant contribution’ to (e)nhancing sus-
tainable growth’ (§1). Apart from the continued pursuit of ‘free, fair 
and open trade’ via multi-lateral ‘regulatory convergence’ (§2), this 
document stresses the particular importance of enhancing bi-lateral 
                                                                 
7 Capacity utilisation, having slumped from 84.3 per cent in the EU27 (EU17: 84.7 per 
cent) in 2008 to 71.1 per cent in 2009, recovered to 80.5 per cent in 2011 but had 
declined to 77.4 per cent in 2012: IV (EU17: 76.9 per cent), with just a marginal 
improvement in January 2013 to 77.6 per cent (77.2 per cent). C.f. European Central 
Bank, Monthly Bulletin, various; European Commission 2013: 9. 
8 It is noteworthy that the CIA World Factbook places the EU in 189th position in its 
league table of GDP growth for 2012, with 22 EU member states in the bottom 60: 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html> 
(last accessed 14 April 2014). 
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links with ‘key partners’, most notably the USA, Japan, Canada, 
Russia, China, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the Common Market of the South) (MERCOSUR) and the eastern 
‘neighbourhood’ (§6–8). 
 
The reader is asked to believe that this ‘ambitious trade agenda’ will 
lead ‘in the medium term to an overall increase of 2 per cent in 
growth and to the creation of two million jobs’ (§1). Given the lack of 
supporting evidence for this claim, there are minimal grounds for 
optimism in the Council’s confident predictions. The reasons for a 
pessimistic assessment of the EU’s strategy are many and varied. The 
systemic factors which suggest short-, medium- and long-term failure 
will be examined later in this paper. At this juncture, a few remarks 
about a policy of export-led recovery in Europe will suffice: 
 
 Over 60 per cent of the EU member states’ exports involve intra-EU 
trade; intra-EU trade declined by 6 per cent in 2012, intra-eurozone 
trade by 7 per cent (Eurostat 2013b: 28); with stagnation/austerity 
depressing domestic demand factors within the EU27, the 
predictable outcome for this predominant mode of European trade 
is a continuing contraction of intra-EU trade volumes. 
 
 Exports to non-EU countries constitute 14.1 per cent of GDP in the 
EU27; furthermore, 73.5 per cent of extra-EU trade is accounted for 
by just six economies (Germany, Italy, France, UK, Belgium and 
Netherlands), slightly more than their share of regional GDP (70.7 
per cent). The main thrust of any export-contribution to growth 
(net exports) will therefore come from these six economies and will 
have to be considerably greater than +2 per cent in order to 
compensate for the decline in both domestic demand and intra-EU 
trade. Net exports of the same order as Germany’s postwar average 
of some +3.2 per cent (1950–1980) would be required over an 
extended period to achieve this objective; even if such a strategy 
were considered desirable, its feasibility is very questionable. 
 
 There is an assumption in the growth-through-trade logic that – 
in terms of extra-EU trade and payments – the EU27/EU17 is a 
unitary ‘actor’ where the standard dynamics of neo-classical 
international economic relations apply, i.e. there is a rebalancing 
of those relations towards equilibrium via the current account, 
the capital account and the exchange rate through the operation 
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of open markets. That is, both Europe’s problems of competi-
tiveness and its growth weaknesses can be addressed by 
providing easier access for the EU’s exported goods and services. 
There are several problems with this assumption, not least that 
the EU’s aggregate external balances and aggregate growth rate 
are the primary measures of success when assessing the region’s 
performance and the quality of the Commission’s crisis manage-
ment. While it might be possible to exploit hitherto untapped 
demand for European goods, there should be no illusions about 
either the likely beneficiaries of such demand (namely the core 
states noted above) or the predominance of high-grade industrial 
goods in such trade (vehicles, chemicals, electro-technical goods), 
again originating within the so-called ‘blue banana’).9 
 
 An undifferentiated policy of growth through further trade-
liberalisation reflects, above all, the critical neglect of intra-
EU/intra-eurozone trade and payments asymmetries as fundamental 
features of Europe’s structural problems. These and other 
asymmetries were ignored by the authors of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997 and of 
the Fiscal Compact of 2012. The ‘design faults of the European 
Monetary Union’ (Arestis and Sawyer 2011) and to a lesser 
extent of the Single Market are rooted in large measure in this 
neglect and in the faith that such asymmetries are resolved 
through the operation of ‘efficient’ markets. The, now deeply 
entrenched, regional crisis triggered by the collapse of the 
global financial system in September 2008 has exposed both the 
huge disparities in external economic balances (Figure 1.11) and 
the folly of neglecting their macro-economic effects on the part 
of both the Commission and major member states, particularly 
in relation to the evolution of interest rate spreads on sovereign 
bonds (Figure 1.12). 
 
 
                                                                 
9 The ‘blue banana’ denotes the strip of highly urbanised, highly industrialised territory 
stretching from the North-West of England through France, the Benelux, western 
Germany, to northern Italy and which accounts for a high proportion of both industrial 
production and industrial and commercial innovation in Europe; machinery and 
transport equipment exports constitute a full 42.2 per cent of all extra EU-27 exports, 
with manufacturing accounting for 82.6 per cent (Figures from Eurostat 2011: 56). 
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Figure 1.11 EU27 current account balances as a percentage of GDP 
2011. 
Source: Eurostat: European Union balance of payments [bop_q_eu] 
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Figure 1.12: The divergence of interest rates on fixed interest 
sovereign bonds 2008–10. 
Source: Econweekly, 10 September 2012 
 
 17 out of the EU’s 27 member states have significant trade deficits; 
15 member states have serious-to-chronic current account deficits 
and five member states have chronic current account surpluses 
(Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark and Germany). 
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With 9 deficitary states locked into a monetary union with key 
states with chronic surpluses (Germany and the Netherlands), 
their competitive disadvantages (of lower productivity and 
higher rates of inflation) cannot now be neutralised by exchange 
rate adjustments. Furthermore, those competitive disadvantages 
are amplified, firstly, by the need to balance current account 
deficits through the capital account, by persuading foreign 
investors to purchase sovereign bonds, secondly by both the 
upward pressure on interest rates and the associated speculative 
attacks on bond-related derivatives markets and thirdly by the 
down-grading of the sovereign bonds of individual countries by 
credit-rating agencies (EuroMemo Group 2012: 32). 
 
Figure 1.12 indicates the extent of the problem of bond-spreads for 
the eurozone and the rest of the EU from an early stage in the global 
crisis. Where pre-crisis spreads of Greek sovereign bonds against 10-
year German Bunds had fallen to as low as 10–30 basis points (Tavlas, 
Hall and Gibson 2011: 6), 2009 saw an early destabilisation of the 
bond market, with spreads stretching to 300 basis points in the 
Spring, with later spikes in the winter of 2009–10, exceeding 900 basis 
points (9 per cent) in May 2010. From the outset, there were proposals 
for the issuance of common Eurobonds10 as a means of preventing the 
destructive effect of wide bond spreads on sovereign borrowing costs 
and overall sovereign debt. All such calls have been resisted, in 
particular by the recent German centre-right coalition government 
under Angela Merkel. While the various stabilisation measures 
adopted by the EU (European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, 
European Financial Stability Facility, European Stability Mechanism) 
have achieved a marginal narrowing of spreads, the overall damage 
inflicted on the Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian economies by 
higher-than-necessary borrowing costs and by pro-cyclical 
conditionalities, attached to EFSM. EFSF and ESM loans, provides 
overwhelming evidence for the culpable dilatoriness of policy-
makers in addressing the structural asymmetries summarised above. 
Münchau (2011)11 talks rightly of ‘financial illiteracy’. 
 
                                                                 
10 See, for example W. Münchau ‘The benefits of a single European bond’, Financial 
Times, 25 January 2009. 
11 W. Münchau ‘The only way to save the Eurozone from collapse’, Financial Times, 13 
November 2011. 
Reversing the neoliberal deformation of Europe 75 
 
Export-led growth, flanked by domestic deleveraging – of households, 
enterprises and states – is indeed a highly questionable strategy. 
Raghuram Rajan, former chief economist at the IMF, describes this 
strategy as one of the major ‘fault lines’ of the global economy in recent 
decades, in particular as it relates to states like Germany that have 
deliberately depressed domestic demand to optimise their inter-
national competitive advantages (Rajan 2010: 46–67). In particular the 
accelerated erosion of public investment in particular crisis-hit 
countries, like Spain, Greece and Portugal will compound their 
competitive disadvantages and postpone the economic convergence of 
peripheral economies that is the precondition for the survival of the 
European project. In Spain, government spending on R&D is reported 
to have been cut by 40 per cent since 2009, reinforcing a brain-drain 
scientists and technicians12, mirroring similar developments in Greece 
(Trachana 2013) and Portugal (Caldas 2012). There is a grim irony to 
such death-blows to the ‘Lisbon Strategy’. 
End the tyranny of neoliberalism 
In an interview with the German daily, Die Welt, the former president 
of the German Bundesbank, Helmut Schlesinger, suggested that the 
money issuance of the European Central Bank had reached 
‘dimensions that are reminiscent of war-financing’ but unprecedented 
(and by implication unacceptable) in peacetime13; accordingly he 
warned of serious inflationary consequences for the German and 
European economies. The war analogy, designed by Schlesinger to 
ridicule the irresponsibility of the ECB and its departure from 
Bundesbank virtues, is in fact much more appropriate than he would 
ever be prepared to concede. The analysis above has attempted to 
demonstrate that the neoliberal paradigm (deregulation, financialisa-
tion and monetary accumulation) generated a two-fold destruction of 
value, akin to the devastating effects of war, with neoliberal austerity 
currently threatening a further period of destruction and depression. 
The dilution of social wealth since 1980 operated hand-in-hand with 
the most profound redistribution of income and wealth in modern 
times, generating serious diseconomies for current and future 
                                                                 
12 ‘Brain Drain in Spain leaves scientific research on the wane’, Financial Times, 14 June 
2013. 
13 ‘Das erinnert an die Kriegsfinanzierung’, Die Welt, 13 March 2012, retrieved from: 
<http://www.welt.de/print/wams/wirtschaft/article13915232/Das-erinnert-an-
die-Kriegsfinanzierung.html> (last accessed 8 October 2013). 
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generations, even before 2008. Counterfactual estimates would suggest 
that the well-being of future generations could have been better 
ensured if the investment ratios and wages ratios of advanced states 
had remained at their 1980 levels, indeed that their maintenance would 
have been reciprocally strengthened with the parallel improvements of 
productivity, wages and consumption. The factual destruction of 
potential value in the processes of financialisation and the sharp 
decline in public investments between 1980 and 2008 precedes and pre-
programmes the factual and inevitable disaster of both the systemic 
collapse of monetary accumulation in the winter of 2008/2009 and the 
subsequent hapless attempts to manage the crisis. 
 
The alarming estimates of potential permanent global output losses of 
up to $200 trillion – with current annual global GDP at around $78 
trillion – do not actually begin to illustrate the challenges facing 
world policy-makers, particularly in the advanced economies. 
Recovery from the cataclysm of the Second World War involved arguably 
fewer strategic challenges than the current mess. For example, the evident 
need, after the War, to make good the colossal physical damage to 
commercial, domestic and public property, to urban infrastructures, 
to national and international transport networks, was combined with 
a state-welfarist policy consensus and a profound preparedness to 
cooperate within and between nations which allowed a rapid 
transition to growth and prosperity in the 1950s. This was reinforced 
by the emergence of both consumerism and the technical-managerial 
means (Fordism) to satisfy the burgeoning demand of increasingly 
affluent households. The 2008 crisis manifests none of these auspicious 
pre-conditions for recovery and reconstruction: 
 
 There are no general physical signs of a catastrophe to be 
remedied; 
 
 There is no shared acknowledgement of the unnecessary follies 
of the neoliberal paradigm as there was of the need to reverse the 
(unavoidable) privations of war; 
 
 There is no shared diagnosis of the causes and extent of the crisis; 
there have been no mass resignations from the Economics 
departments of universities and research institutes in OECD 
countries; there is no self-evident replacement for a discredited 
system; 
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 There is significantly no overwhelming need for a marked 
increase in consumer goods provision – saturation of markets 
and unpredictable elasticities of demand predominate; 
 
 There is, above all, no common view about the need for an 
increase in the provision of public goods, even if an increasing 
number of voices are raised in support of public goods as 
vehicles for general human progress. 
 
Policy options 
There are new debates emerging about the nature of economic and 
social relations and in particular about the need for greater equity and 
‘fairness’, and a central role for an active state. The continuing 
mobilisation of such forces and an intensification of public debate 
within and across borders is an urgent priority. A number of stark 
policy-options suggest themselves from the analysis above. These run 
counter to the policy preferences, currently being pursued by the 
European Union. The obsessive attachment of Brussels to the German 
‘model’ of export-led growth and deflation on the one hand, together 
with its inexplicable thraldom to the wisdom of credit-ratings agencies 
and major banks, threatens to condemn Europe to an extended period 
of stagnation, protectionist nationalism and political fragmentation. The 
early signs of multi-lateral coordination within the G20 have all but 
evaporated, weakening one essential pre-condition for effective crisis 
management. If, however, the ‘rebalancing’ of Europe – as proposed in 
this paper – is to be achieved, and the destructive tyranny of neoliberal 
recipes undone, certain basic policy options would seem to be essential: 
 
 Regulatory Control and Limitation of Banking: Given the 
dilution and destruction of value resulting from the irresponsible 
neoliberal experiment with financialised capitalism and the 
equally hazardous roll-back of the state, there is an increasingly 
strong case for the (temporary) public control of the commanding 
heights of finance capital as a means of restoring a modicum of 
allocatory good sense to the reinvestment of social wealth as a 
real basis for sustainable human development, along with a 
much higher level of legitimacy. Political economies that seek to 
promote the welfare of all of their citizens simply cannot afford 
financial services that are predominantly self-serving, which 
divert corporate reserves into value-destroying Ponzi-style 
‘financial investments’ away from value- and welfare-enhancing 
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real investments. They cannot operate effectively with a sector 
whose total balance sheets, as in the case of the UK, grew from 
just 50 per cent of GDP to 500 per cent of GDP between 1970 and 
2008. Financial services essentially need to be returned to the 
service function of collectively beneficial and controllable circuits 
of investment, production and consumption. 
 
 Fairer Distribution: Additionally, policy-makers in advanced 
economies need to address the critical disparities of distribution within 
the future context of far lower and far less predictable trend-growth; 
learning to cope with weak or zero quantitative growth while 
allowing poorer economies to converge towards a sustainable 
level of qualitative growth is arguably the most critical task facing 
post-crisis societies. 
 
 Public Goods: Within qualitative growth scenarios, likewise, the 
role of public goods in the broadest sense (health, education, 
legitimacy, social inclusion, distributional equity as public goods) 
will inevitably become more rather than less significant, in line 
with Wagner’s Law of state tax ratios rising with levels of 
civilisation. Central to this strategy is the restoration of a strong 
programme of public investment. 
 
 Realistic Rates of Return: A further challenge to all participants 
in the recalibrated political economies of the OECD and of Europe 
is to overcome the structural addiction to unrealistic rates of 
return that have too long informed the investment strategies of 
the managers of sovereign wealth funds, pension funds and other 
investment funds and, by implication, generated the exaggerated 
management fees extracted from Ponzi-style investment vehicles. 
Above all, the current and future sustainability of retirement 
pensions will have to become increasingly the subject of general 
distributional debates within society concerning their intergene-
rational equity, rather than of intra-fund adjustments. 
 
 Deficit-Spending and/or Monetisation as Necessity: The current 
contradictory trajectory of European states and their pro-cyclical 
strategy of growth through austerity (!), represents a public ‘bad’ 
which needs to be reversed as a matter of extreme urgency. The 
analysis above has attempted to demonstrate that the cumulative 
crises that have hit Europe since 2008 represent more intractable 
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problems than those facing states in the reconstruction period 
after World War II. The levels of sovereign debt in Europe generated by 
the 2008 crisis are accordingly by no means extraordinary by historical 
comparison. The UK’s sovereign debt in 1948 was 237 per cent of 
GDP, that of the Netherlands and Belgium 223 and 118 per cent 
respectively.14 It took some 20 years before the debt of these states 
fell to Maastricht-compliant levels; expecting the EU17/EU27 to 
achieve these levels by 2013 indicated monumental stupidity. 
Against the background of the critical asymmetries generated by 
the neoliberal paradigm and the consequently greater challenges 
of promoting debt-reduction via growth, the case for tolerating 
higher levels of debt in the medium term to avoid even greater 
economic asymmetries and the collapse of the European project, 
is thus overwhelming, as is the case for Eurobonds within the 
eurozone. Beyond the simple toleration of debt- and deficit-ratios, 
however, there is growing momentum within both heterodox 
and, now, orthodox circles for more radical solutions to Europe’s 
New Depression. These include: 
 
 The debt jubilee idea, proposed by economists like Steve Keen 
(2009)15 and Willem Buiter16, and popularised by a number of 
financial journalists, e.g. Evans-Pritchard (2009)17; this proposal 
proceeds from the (correct) assumption a) of the impossibility of 
all economic actors in advanced economies deleveraging 
simultaneously without inducing long-term stagnation, and b) of 
the primary culpability of financial institutions in generating 
historically record levels of private debt. The ‘jubilee’ involves 
finance ministries (via central banks) financing the wholesale 
repayment of private debt by means of unsecured money issue as 
                                                                 
14 Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2012) ‘This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly’, Statistical database, retrieved from: 
<http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/> (last accessed 13 August 2013). 
15 See also ‘Steve Keen on BBC Hardtalk’, retrived from <http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rGkmgnprrIU&feature=player_embedded> (last accessed 13 August 2013). 
16 Buiter, W. (2009) ‘Quantitative easing, credit easing and enhanced credit support 
aren’t working; here’s why’, Financial Times, Willem Buiter’s Maverecon, 3 July 2009, 
retrieved from: <http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/07/quantitative-easing-
credit-easing-and-enhanced-credit-support-arent-working-heres-
why/#axzz2r8j6hFl0> (last accessed 13 August 2013). 
17 A. Evans-Pritchard ‘Biblical debt jubilee may be the only answer’, The Telegraph, 19 
January 2009. 
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the most effective means of neutralising the current paralysis of 
financial circuits and encouraging growth via debt-free consump-
tion and investment. Keen, who is strongly influenced by 
Hermann Minsky, asserts current crisis-management measures are 
entirely inadequate to cope with the colossal (and underestimated) 
scale of the crisis, equivalent to ‘bailing out the Titanic with a 
thimble’ (2009: 3). It arguably remains a question of faith, how the 
transmission belt of debt-forgiveness will function in revivified 
circuits of consumption, investment and finance, but the radical 
diagnosis is certainly apt, as is the perception of an urgent need to 
constrain speculative finance (ibid.: 21). 
 
 A related but arguably more refined policy-prescription involves 
the creation of so-called helicopter money or the selective 
monetisation of government expenditure. This example of 
‘thinking the unthinkable’ has been strikingly popularised by the 
Financial Times, in particular Martin Wolf)18 and by the outgoing 
chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, Adair Turner. 
Turner in particular takes issue with Germany’s obsession with 
hyperinflation and its neglect of Brüning’s depression economics 
and its ushering-in of fascism: ‘Is [monetary financing] desperately 
dangerous because every pound of money financed turns into 
inflation? Absolutely not. There is no coherent rigorous bit of 
economics that takes you in that direction’19. In contrast to the debt 
jubilee stimulating private demand, the monetisation proposals 
behind helicopter money tend to focus on state-managed, targeted 
investment projects in infrastructure and other public goods. 
McCulley and Poszar (2013) provide the most coherent and 
persuasive argument for both helicopter money and for a more 
decisive coordination of fiscal and monetary policy as vehicles for 
                                                                 
18 M. Wolf ‘A Case to Reconsider the Basis of Monetary Policy’, Financial Times, 8 
February 2013; M. Wolf ‘The Case for Helicopter Money’, Financial Times, 12 
February 2013. See also ‘Helicopter Money and Supply Siders’, Financial Times 
(Editorial), 6 February 2013. 
19 ‘Print money to fund spending – Turner’, Financial Times, 6 February 2013, 
retrieved from: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1be21d54-6fb5-11e2-956b-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2hmaRZauF> (last accessed 15 October 2013). Wolf, M. ‘The 
Case for Helicopter Money’, Financial Times, 12 February 2013, comes to a similar 
conclusion: ‘I fail to see any moral force to the idea that fiat money should only 
promote private spending’. 
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recovery; they also provide convincing arguments to demolish the 
inflation-fears of German and other opponents of monetisation. 
 
Reconfiguring economic governance in Europe: 
public goods, taxation and the state 
In December 2008, it seemed as if at least one practical lesson had 
been learned by both policy-makers and civil society, namely that the 
role of the state was, contrary to the prejudices of the preceding 30 
years, central to the survival of capitalism and the continuous 
management of its deficiencies. The deployment of colossal volumes 
of public resources to provide life-support to national financial 
institutions as well as international networks of banking and pay-
ments, should at least have laid to rest the delusion of ‘the’ markets’ 
self-healing properties. The call for decisive political action, for 
international cooperation and coordination was deafening; the 
response of EU, G7, G20, the Federal Reserve, the European Central 
Bank, Bank of England, the World Bank and the IMF was admirably 
urgent. National, international and supranational governance and re-
regulation was seemingly acknowledged as pre-conditions for 
recovery. By the same token, the financing of salvage operations for 
banks and of counter-cyclical stimulus packages via budget deficits 
enjoyed at the very least the tacit support of the economic elites and 
the citizens of the advanced economies. 
 
However, despite such auspicious beginnings, 2009 saw the rapid 
return of what Richard Murphy has recently coined ‘the cowardly 
state’ (Murphy 2011) with the re-assertion of the primacy of deflation 
and debt-consolidation among key EU states and at Commission 
level. The opportunity to reflect on failure and alter course has thus 
been woefully squandered, raising the suspicion that a neoliberal 
policy-elite is indeed using the opportunity to ‘finish the job’, to 
complete a pan-European neoliberal strategy (Buckel et al. 2012: 30ff) 
and weaken European social provision even further as a supply-side 
inducement to retain the loyalty of capital (Lehndorff 2012: 24). 
 
The ‘competitive state’ (Hirsch 1995) is the opposite of the activist 
state of New Deal Keynesianism; it is not even the ordoliberal state, 
pursuing national mercantilist goals, but the subaltern set of 
institutions within an interdependent network, controlled by 
transnational capital as a hierarchised historical bloc. The capture of 
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Europe’s advanced states by transnational capital epitomises 
Huffschmid’s notion of ‘deformation’. Replacing these deformed struc-
tures of governance Europe-wide with new institutions of collective, 
multi-level democratic control with strong commitments to harmoni-
sed principles of active and socially just fiscal policies is the 
fundamental challenge for this and future generations of European 
civil societies. The obstacles in the way of both salvaging what is left 
of ‘social Europe’ are considerable and have been multiplying since 
the aggressive reassertion of pro-cyclical, neoliberal debt-reduction 
programmes in 2009. What is also becoming increasingly evident is 
that the challenge is one of a fundamental, socio-cultural nature, made 
particularly problematic by the capitulation of many established, 
social democratic parties to key tenets of the neoliberal revolution; 
indeed the capture of these parties and of significant sections of both 
electorate and civil society by interest-driven media campaigns and 
their sanctification of consumerism and individualism helped to 
generate new waves of expectation in relation to lifestyle, income, 
expenditure, pensions which were critically dependent on Ponzi-style 
capitalism. These effects have survived the collapse of the latter and, 
at the very least, interfere with processes of reflecting on and 
recalibrating those lifestyles. The competition states of Europe have, 
through their collective powerlessness and their separate degrees of 
national failure, also contributed to a weakening of faith in conven-
tional democratic politics, where resignation and cynicism would 
seem to be stronger than reflective, dynamic opposition to the 
historical bloc, even if that opposition is growing. 
 
The neoliberal programme of crisis management is set to intensify the 
competition between member states as they dilute further their 
provision of public goods, services and social security; the ‘race to the 
bottom’ is accelerating (Genschel et al. 2011). Hitherto, this ‘location 
competition’ has increased the disparities in the external balances of 
the EU, in particular within the eurozone, with German current 
account surpluses growing in relation to most other member states 
(Lehndorff 2012: 92). The demand and supply asymmetries between 
eurozone members are mirrored by the shift in demand structures in 
individual countries, with weak domestic demand in Germany offset 
by increasing dependence on export demand as a vehicle for growth. 
Further demand asymmetries have been generated by the growing 
disparities in income distribution. 
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Persisting with the German ‘model’ will exacerbate rather than 
alleviate these asymmetries. Rebalancing them is a precondition to 
European recovery. A precondition for altering course is the refining 
and radicalising of politico-economic discourse in the civil societies of all 
member states. This requires, at the very least, a coalition of forces against 
neoliberal orthodoxy and the influence of transnational capital. The initial 
primary focus of this coalition must arguably be the 
restoration/creation of the active fiscal state which redistributes social 
resources for the benefit of the overwhelming majority of its citizens – 
the 99 per cent as the central banner of the Occupy movement 
suggests. Fiscal rebalancing has to be rooted in a European consensus 
about the very purpose of taxation. Annamaria Simonazzi summarises the 
challenge correctly as an educational task: 
 
The understanding of taxes has to be linked to the 
understanding of services: people have to learn again, that it 
is their health, that it is education, kindergartens and the care 
of the elderly, that they pay for. 
(Simonazzi 2012: 194) 
 
Currently, the absence of a serious revenue dimension to fiscal 
harmonisation represents Europe’s greatest structural deficiency in 
policy-making; monetarist strictures about debt and expenditure 
predominate. One of the few successful initiatives in the direction of 
tax harmonisation – the European Savings Directive – has been fatally 
weakened by the bilateral tax deals between Switzerland and two of 
the EU’s major neoliberal strongholds, the UK and Germany. A 
sensible point of departure for a broad, pan-European opposition to 
the destructive effects of such wilful beggar-thy-neighbour policies 
and the EU’s historical failure to promote tax harmonisation (Leaman 
2012a) would include the elements outlined below: 
 
Box 1.2 Towards a new fiscal consensus in Europe 
1. A Fiscal Union and Settlement Union of the EU17 based on the 
long-term commitment to eradicating poverty, unemployment 
and social exclusion; as a Settlement Union the eurozone would 
deploy its resources collectively to ensure the relative 
convergence of external balances, of national and regional ratios 
of investment, private consumption and public consumption to 
GDP against the condition to outlaw fiscal free-riding with the 
abolition of tax and regulatory competition and a relative 
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convergence of states with low tax ratios (see Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal) to a higher average. 
 
2. A constitutional rearrangement of Europe’s policy architecture, 
removing the democratic deficit of an autonomous, unanswer-
able European Central Bank, establishing the obligation for 
policy coordination between fiscal authorities and monetary 
authorities and a policy brief based on economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. 
 
3. The Fiscal Union of the EU17 would allow deficit-spending for 
anti-cyclical purposes and for structural modernisation, without 
the imposition of arbitrary ceilings to deficits or overall debt (no 
Debt Brake!) and with mutually assured Eurobonds. 
 
4. Fiscal harmonisation within the EU27 which ends tax 
competition, establishing minimum standards for direct and 
indirect taxation, maximising transparency, automatic infor-
mation exchange and compliance-policing: 
 
 Agreed minimum rates of personal income tax (PIT) and 
corporation tax (CT); 
 Commitment to the principle of progressive income 
taxation (phasing-out of flat-tax regimes and relative 
convergence of scales of progression); 
 A Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base; 
 Country-by-Country reporting/Publish What You Pay; 
 Formulary Apportionment associated with CBCR; 
 Restriction of national variations of special allowances on 
both PIT and CT to the purposes of rectifying current 
account asymmetries and productivity disparities; 
 Outlawing of European tax havens/secrecy jurisdictions; 
 Boycott of financial corporations and other companies 
operating ‘brass plate’ business in overseas tax havens; 
 Tax avoidance to be made as ethically unacceptable as 
human trafficking. 
 
The restoration of a strong and well-resourced fiscal state represents a 
minimum consensus around which progressive forces in Europe could 
and should be mobilised. On these foundations, the obstacles to 
sustainable social development could be removed and the objectives 
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of a courageous, activist state could be addressed. The removal of the 
legal, institutional and organisational pillars of neoliberalism – as the 
historical means of social and economic ‘deformation’ – would be as 
radical as the original Thatcherite ‘revolution’: 
 
 The public ownership of utilities as natural monopolies should be 
restored and other sources of monopoly rents (Private Finance 
Initiatives, e.g.) eliminated. The provision of water services, public 
transport, power distribution, health, education and social welfare 
as public goods is the natural function of the public sector; the 
commodification of those services as a vehicle for the direct 
valorisation of capital is incompatible with a society committed to 
collective responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, based on 
solidarity, social justice and democratic legitimacy. The recent 
accelerated privatisation of public utility companies and service 
providers as a condition for EU assistance for states with 
temporary sovereign debt problems (Greece, Portugal) must be 
reversed; securing comfortable income-streams from monopoly 
franchise/supply operations inflates rate-of-return expectations 
and reduces entrepreneurial incentives to invest in commercial 
activities that are subject to market pressures. 
 
 The on-going paralysis of commercial investment in many EU 
countries is in part informed by the distortions in profit 
expectations generated by 30 years of neoliberal privatisation. 
This paralysis furthermore demands a long-term role for the 
public sector in underpinning national and regional investment 
demand and has consequently informed a number of proposals 
by progressive economists for the establishment of state-owned 
investment banks to fill the void left by coy private banks (Murphy 
2011: 274ff) and for the European Investment bank to fund 
infrastructure projects (EuroMemo Group 2010: 4, 40; EuroMemo 
Group 2011: 3, 34); state investment banks would be financed 
directly by central banks, by-passing the hitherto fruitless and 
dubious route involving liquidity injections into private banks. 
 
 The third key function of the active state is to counteract the 
pernicious redistribution of income and wealth that has 
characterised the neoliberal era; this cannot simply involve the 
secondary transfer of state resources to produce a less inequitable 
distribution of net incomes, but must also address the more critical 
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and growing disparities of market incomes; the record of the UK 
Labour government (1997–2010) demonstrated the haplessness of 
an anti-poverty strategy that neglected the central function of 
market distribution, deploying colossal volumes of state transfers 
merely to prevent a further rise in an already high Gini coefficient 
(see Leaman 2013). Fiscal transfers play an important but secon-
dary role, compared to statutes of industrial and employment law 
which allow productivity increases and profit growth to be 
reflected in the growth of real wages. Ending the destructive 
tyranny of neoliberalism represents a colossal challenge, not just in 
the mechanical delivery of a radical new policy-mix, but above all 
as an intellectual and cultural learning-process. Such change 
cannot be delivered by an insurrectionist vanguard in individual 
nation-states, but by a broadly-based, well-informed, dynamic 
coalition of progressive forces operating at a variety of levels – 
local, regional, national, global, virtual. We need such a coalition 
to ensure that we bequeath our grandchildren halfway adequate 
foundations for decency, justice, sustainability and coexistence. 
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